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aBstraCt
At least since Kripke (1980) it has been generally accepted that true identity statements 
involving proper names are necessarily true. This view is allegedly supported by our most 
ordinary, pretheoretic intuitions according to which ordinary proper names are rigid 
designators. This paper challenges the established status of  this view. Section 1 develops 
the context of  the debate by presenting the intuitions of  rigidity and of  contingency 
of  identity found among competent speakers. Section 2 shows how the latter constitute 
a serious problem for the received view, one that cannot be easily ignored. Section 
3 considers three available proposals intended to solve the problem and shows why 
they fail. Section 4 briefly describes a way to make compatible the intuitions of  rigidity 
and of  contingency, a consequence of  which is the acceptance of  the possibility of  
contingently true identity statements. If  this is correct, then a longstanding thesis of  
contemporary orthodoxy owed to Kripke (1980), namely, that the rigidity of  names 
entails the necessity of  true claims involving them, turns out to be doubtful. Section 5 
considers some philosophical consequences of  accepting such a view.
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rEsuMEn
Al menos desde Kripke (1980) se ha aceptado de manera general que toda oración de 
identidad verdadera que emplee nombres propios es necesariamente verdadera. Esta 
postura está supuestamente apoyada por intuiciones ordinarias, preteóricas, según las 
cuales los nombres propios ordinarios son designadores rígidos. Este texto pretende 
cuestionar el estatus establecido de esta postura. La primera sección desarrolla el con-
texto del debate al presenter las intuiciones de rigidez y de contingencia de la identidad 
que es possible encontrar entre hablantes competentes. La segunda sección muestra 
cómo es que estas últimas constituyen un problema serio para la postura tradicional, 
un problema que no puede ser fácilmente ignorado. La tercera sección considera tres 
propuestas disponibles que pretenden resolver el problema y muestra cómo éstas fra-
casan. La cuarta sección describe brevemente una manera en la que es possible hacer 
compatibles las intuiciones de rigidez y contingencia, con la consecuencia de aceptar 
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la posibilidad de que existan oraciones de identidad contingentemente verdaderas. Si 
esto es correcto, entonces una de las tesis más duraderas de la ortodoxia contemporá-
nea debida a Kripke (1980), a saber, que la rigidez de los nombres implica la necesidad 
de las afirmaciones verdaderas que los emplean, resulta ser dudosa. La última sección 
considera algunas consecuencias filosóficas de aceptar esta propuesta.
PaLaBras CLavE: Nombres propios, oraciones de identidad, intuiciones de hablantes.
1. intuitions oF rigidity and ContingEnCy
Competent speakers commonly use ordinary proper names to refer to some 
individual person, location, or object in the course of  making a modal claim about 
that person, location or object. The way such expressions are used to make modal 
claims, and what this use says about the nature of  such expressions, has been 
the subject of  much discussion, particularly when it comes to accounting for 
the intuitions that competent speakers have about the truth conditions of  the 
associated statements. It is these intuitions that constitute the relevant explananda. 
Let me then consider the explananda in detail.
1.1. Intuitions of  Rigidity
According to Kripke (1980), if  we want to properly understand rigidity we 
must look at competent speaker intuitions because “we have a direct intuition of  
the rigidity of  names, exhibited in our understanding of  the truth conditions of  
particular statements.” [Kripke, 1980: 14] Thus, Kripke asks us to consider the 
truth conditions of  the following two statements:
(1) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle.
(2) Aristotle might not have been the teacher of  Alexander the Great.
Intuitively, Kripke claims, (1) seems to express something necessarily false, 
while (2) appears to express something true. If  so, then, again intuitively, it seems 
that (1) and (2) differ in modal profile. Yet, (1) and (2) only differ in that (2) makes 
use of  a definite description (‘the teacher of  Alexander the Great’) whereas (1) 
uses an ordinary proper name (‘Aristotle’). Thus, according to these intuitions the 
proper name ‘Aristotle’ and the definite description ‘the teacher of  Alexander the 
Great’ differ in their respective modal profile.
Now consider the modal truth conditions of  statement (3)
(3) Aristotle was fond of  dogs.
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Intuitively, again, it seems that all one needs to determine whether (3) expresses 
something true in any given world is to ask what is true about Aristotle himself  
in such world.1
Together these intuitions deliver the following explananda E1-E3 for any 
satisfactory account of  our modal intuitions:
E1: Statements (1) and (2) differ in truth conditions.
E2: ‘Aristotle’ and ‘the teacher of  Alexander the Great’ differ in modal profile.
E3: The modal truth conditions of  (3) depend only on Aristotle.
Kripke’s (1980) account of  modal intuitions E1-E3 is based on the semantic 
notions of  rigid designator and rule of  rigidity, which are defined as follows.
• Rigid Designator: A designating term is a rigid designator “if  in every possible 
world it designates the same object.” [1980:48]2
• Rule of  Rigidity: “that there is a single individual and a single property such 
that, with respect to every counterfactual situation, the truth conditions of  
the proposition are the possession of  the property by that individual in that 
situation.” [1980:10]
Given the assumption that the truth of  statements (1)-(3) depends on what 
properties the designated objects have, these semantic notions entail that statements 
involving rigid designators will have truth conditions that observe the rule of  
rigidity. To properly account for the explananda, the semantic account makes two 
bold empirical claims about ordinary proper names and definite descriptions.3
1 These examples and intuitions reflect what are traditionally taken to be Kripke’s evidence on 
behalf  of  his theory. For details see Hughes 2004, Gómez-Torrente 2006, Salmon 1982 and 
2003, Soames 2002, and Stanley 1997, among others.
2 It is often argued that we must distinguish between different versions of  rigid designator (see 
Kaplan, 1989; Salmon, 1981, 2003, 2005; Soames, 2002; and Gómez-Torrente, 2006), varying 
with respect to what happens in worlds where the referent of  the designator does not exist. 
The differences between these versions of  rigid designator are irrelevant for the purpose of  the 
present discussion.
3 Kripke (1980) makes a further distinction between de jure and de facto rigid designators. A 
designator is de jure rigid, if  its reference “is stipulated to be a single object, whether we are 
speaking of  the actual world or a counterfactual situation”. There is de facto rigidity when “a 
description ‘the x such that Fx’ happens to use a predicate ‘F’ that in each possible world is 
true of  one and the same unique object (e.g., ‘the smallest prime’ rigidly designates the number 
two).” [Kripke, 1980: 21, ft 21] According to Kripke, ordinary proper names are de jure rigid, 
while some definite descriptions may be so only de facto.
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• Proper Names: Ordinary proper names (i.e., names of  persons, locations, 
cities, etc.) are rigid designators.
• Definite Descriptions: Ordinary definite descriptions (i.e., of  persons, locations, 
cities, etc.) are non-rigid designators.
Together, the semantic definitions and the empirical claims offer an account 
of  E1-E3.
It is not hard to see how this account, and its accompanying intuitions of  
rigidity, give place to the received view according to which identity is necessary. 
If  as Kripke (1980) claims, ordinary proper names are rigid designators, then they 
denote one and the same individual in all possible worlds. If  we apply this to 
the case of  identity statements involving only proper names, it follows that all 
true such statements are necessarily true. To see this, one need only observe that 
if  an identity statement is true, then the designating terms involved denote the 
same object o. Now, if  these terms happen to be rigid designators, then each will 
denote o in every possible world. It follows that there is no world at which these 
designators will denote different objects and, hence, no possible world at which 
the statement is false. Thus, true identity statements involving only proper names 
are necessarily true.
1.2. Intuitions of  Contingency
According to Kripke, competent speakers’ modal intuitions are “very heavy 
evidence”, it is hard to know “what more conclusive evidence one can have 
about anything, ultimately speaking.” [Kripke, 1980:42]. As it happens, competent 
speakers do not only have intuitions of  rigidity, as Kripke calls them, they also 
happen to have the intuition that there are contingently true identity statements 
involving only proper names.
The intuition that there are contingently true identity statements is usually 
considered a recalcitrant one. Yet, evidence that such intuition exists comes from 
considering a variety of  cases. These cases are concerned with both, pairs that 
happen to be identical but could have been distinct (i.e., contingent identity), and 
pairs that happen to be distinct but could have been identical (i.e., contingent non-
identity). Some cases involve material constitution as part of  the relation between 
the identity (non-identity) pair, others do not. Because of  space limitations I will 
only present four cases owed to Gibbard (1975), Lewis (1986), and Karmo (1983), 
but there are plenty more (see Noonan, 1991, and 1993; Perry, 1972; Myro, 1986a 
and 1986b; for a general survey see Gallois, 1998; and Schwartz, 2013).
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Gibbard’s [1975:191] example is perhaps the most well known case of  
contingent identity. Gibbard presents us with a case of  contingent identity related 
to material constitution. Consider, for example, the process of  creating a statue of, 
say, Goliath by using a certain lump of  clay. A common procedure to achieve this 
goal would be to create, first, two different pieces each one corresponding to the 
upper and lower parts of  Goliath. With both pieces completed, the second step 
involves sticking them together, in order to form a single object made out of  clay. 
As a result we obtain a new object, namely, a new lump of  clay that constitutes 
the statue of  Goliath. This clay statue of  Goliath came into existence only after 
the second step of  the procedure had taken place. Before that there was no statue. 
Now, the lump of  clay that now constitutes the statue came into existence at the 
same point in time as the statue, namely, only after the second step takes place. 
Before that there were only two smaller and distinct lumps of  clay. It seems, thus, 
that by creating the complete statue we have created the lump of  clay.
Now suppose that for some reason you dislike the statue and decide to 
destroy it by smashing it out of  existence. As a result of  this third step the statue 
was sent out of  existence. After that there is no statue. Similarly, since it has been 
obliterated, the lump of  clay that used to constitute the statue is also sent out of  
existence. After the third step there is no lump of  clay. Hence, it seems that by 
destroying the statue we have also destroyed the lump of  clay.
Gibbard asks us to consider this intuitive scenario to reflect upon a few substantial 
lessons concerning material constitution. Whenever we have a statue materially 
constituted by a certain chunk of  matter, we seem to have a pair of  objects that 
share important metaphysical features. They both come into and out of  existence 
at the same point in time and, thus, they persist through time with exactly the same 
conditions. Furthermore, both the lump and the statue have each and every one 
of  their properties in common. “They began at the same time, and on any usual 
account, they had the same shape, location, color, and so forth at each instant in 
their history; everything that happened to one happened to the other; and the act 
that destroyed the one destroyed the other.” [Gibbard, 1975:191]
Thus, the lump-statue pair satisfies Leibniz’s principle of  identity of  indiscernibles 
according to which if  every property of  x is a property of  y, and vice versa, then 
x and y are identical. Hence, it seems best to consider the lump-statue pair as 
constituting a single object or, if  you prefer, a pair of  objects that constitute an 
identity pair. We can express this intuitive truth by means of  an identity statement. 
Furthermore, we can do so by using proper names. Following Gibbard (1975) we 
can coin a couple new names for this purpose. Let us call the statue ‘Goliath’ and 
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the piece of  clay ‘Lumpl’. Given the above, the following identity statement is 
intuitively true:
(4) Lumpl is identical with Goliath.
Thus far, we have an intuitively true identity statement involving proper 
names. But speakers’ intuitions appear to go further, showing that (4) is not only 
intuitively true but also contingently so. To see this one need only observe that just 
as easily as Lumpl is shaped in the form of  Goliath, thereby becoming the statue 
named ‘Goliath’, it could have been shaped in any other distinct form, thereby 
becoming something else, distinct from Goliath. In such a case Lumpl would exist 
but Goliath would not. Suppose, for example, that we follow steps one and two 
of  the above described process for creating Goliath the statue. We stick together 
both smaller lumps of  clay corresponding to the lower and upper parts of  Goliath, 
turning it into a single bigger lump (i.e., Lumpl) and ipso facto creating Goliath. But 
now suppose we dislike the result for whatever reason and so decide not to let 
the clay dry and squeeze it into a ball. In so doing Lumpl would have changed 
its shape, yet it would still exist. Goliath, however, would exist no longer as there 
is now a ball in place of  the statue we originally named ‘Goliath’. At this point 
“Lumpl would not be Goliath, even though they both existed.” [Gibbard, 1975:191]
It follows from this that, with respect to statement (4), intuitions tell us that 
it is contingently true. In other words, Lumpl is identical with Goliath yet not 
necessarily so, as Lumpl may have been a ball of  clay in which case Goliath would 
not have existed. Statement (4) is, intuitively, true yet only contingently so. Given 
that (4) involves only the use of  proper names, this result is seriously problematic 
for the received view (see Kripke, 1980) according to which ordinary proper 
names are rigid designators and identity statements involving only proper names 
are necessarily true if  true at all, or so I will argue in section 2.
One may worry that the fact that the clay materially constitutes the statue may 
be a source of  confusion in this case; as it may be argued that material constitution 
does not constitute identity (but see below). Let us then consider a different case, 
this time material constitution is not involved, and yet intuitions tell us that we 
have contingently true identity statements.
Lewis [1986:248] asks us to consider the historical case of  the Great Western 
Railway (GWR), a British Railway created in 1838 and which still operates nowadays. 
The goal of  the GWR was to connect London with the southwest and west of  
England. To do so the GWR should have had absorbed two other railways, the one 
running from Bristol to Gloucester and the other from Gloucester to Birmingham. 
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Negotiations failed by 1845 and the whole line going from Bristol to Birmingham 
via Gloucester fell into rival hands. Had negotiations gone differently, the GWR 
would have had as a proper part a railway line that it now lacks. It would have been 
a greater railway. What is nowadays known as the Great Western Railway is only 
a part of  what it was meant to be, however, it turned out to be the whole of  it.
There seem to be two different railways being referred to by ‘GWR’. On the 
one hand, there is the GWR as it should have been had things evolved as initially 
planned. Such railway includes both, what we now know as the Great Western 
Railway as well as the Bristol-Gloucester-Birmingham railway. On the other hand, 
there is the GWR as it in fact turned out to be, given that things went awry. This 
railway includes only a part of  the Great Western Railway as it should have been, 
without the Bristol-Gloucester-Birmingham railway. To avoid confusions we may 
use different names for each one of  these two different railways. Let ‘GWR+’ 
name the Great Western Railway as it should have been, the bigger railway that 
includes the Bristol-Gloucester-Birmingham line. Let ‘GWR-’ name the railway as 
it turned out to be, without the Bristol-Gloucester-Birmingham line. Finally, let 
us also use the name ‘GWR’ as it is ordinarily used nowadays, to refer to the still 
operating Great Western Railway.
With these names in hand we can describe the historical situation as follows. 
There is a railway, the Great Western Railway or GWR, as it is commonly known. 
It is uncontroversial that the Great Western Railway is identical with the shorter 
railway, namely the GWR-. Thus, statements (5) and (6) turn out to be both true.
(5) The GWR is identical with the GWR-.
(6) The GWR is not identical with the GWR+.
This, however, is the result of  an unfortunate series of  events. Had things 
gone as planned, the GWR would have included the Bristol-Gloucester-
Birmingham railway. In other words, had things gone as planned, the GWR would 
have been identical with the bigger railway, namely, the GWR+. Intuitively there 
is no metaphysical or conceptual necessity precluding this from happening. Even 
though it didn’t, the GWR could have very easily (and almost did) absorbed the 
Bristol-Gloucester-Birmingham railway. Thus, intuitively, (5*) also turns out to be 
true, as it expresses a genuine nearby possibility.
(5*) The GWR could have been identical with the GWR+.
Now, in the counterfactual scenario described by (5*) it is also the case that 
the GWR is not identical with the minor railway, namely, GWR- for the latter lacks 
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a part that the GWR includes in such scenario. Thus, intuitively, (6*) also turns out 
to be true if  (5+) is.
(6*) The GWR could have been not identical with the GWR-.
Briefly put, the peculiar historical situation of  the Great Western Railway can 
be summarized in four distinct statements, all of  which are intuitively true.:
(5) The GWR is identical with the GWR-.
(6) The GWR is not identical with the GWR+.
(5*) The GWR could have been identical with the GWR+.
(6*) The GWR could have been not identical with the GWR-.
Yet, the only way for all these four statements to be true is for statements (5) 
and (6) to be true yet only contingently so. Thus, we can say that, with respect 
to (5) and (6), speaker intuitions tell us that they both are contingently true. This 
result shows that not only are there intuitions of  contingent identity, but also of  
contingent non-identity — i.e., pairs of  actually distinct objects that might have, 
nonetheless, been the same (e.g., GWR and GWR+).
Both statements, (5) and (6), are true identity statements involving only names 
and, thus, they should not turn out to be contingently true according to Kripke 
(1981). As I will show in section 2, just like contingent identity, contingent non-
identity is inconsistent with the semantic account (see 1.1 above), and examples 
of  contingent non-identity are bountiful. Karmo (1983) offers three of  which I 
would like to consider two, none of  which involve material constitution.
Consider first the case of  family clans (Karmo, 1985:185-186). Whenever 
two clans intermarry they become a single clan as a result, that is, as a matter of  
anthropological fact, the very nature of  family clans. This anthropological datum 
already shows how there can be contingent non-identity, as it is part of  the metaphysics 
(so to speak) of  family clans that they may fuse into a single one. So consider the 
case of  two different clans, the MacLarens an the Adairs. For generations they have 
inhabited neighboring portions of  land, without ever intermarrying. Surprised at 
this peculiar fact, an anthropologist may want to say that, even though they are 
distinct clans, the MacLarens and the Adairs could have very easily become a single 
clan, they could have been the same clan. Thus, intuitively, statement (7) is true.
(7) MacLaren and Adair are not the same clan, but could have been.
Clan names are ordinary names, yet we can use them to express true identity 
statements, like (7), according to which the identity itself  is contingent. Statues, 
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clans, and railways are not the only kind of  entity that seem to justify contingent 
identity claims. The same seems to hold for persons. Karmo (1985:185-186) asks 
us to consider the case of  identical twins. As a matter of  fact they result from the 
splitting of  a fertilized ovum at an early stage of  pregnancy. This phenomenon is, 
even today, a rather obscure one in need of  explanation. It is, in fact, unpredictable 
as a fertilized ovum is more likely not to split and continue its development as a 
single embryo. Consider two identical twins in particular, Linda and Lisa. Given 
how things turned out to be, they happen to be two distinct individuals. Yet, had 
the most likely outcome transpired, the ovum from which they stem would not 
have split at an early stage of  pregnancy, and Linda and Lisa would not have existed 
as two separate individuals. There would have been a single one with exactly the 
same DNA as them. Thuis, intuitively, (8) is true.
(8) Linda and Lisa are not the same person, but could have been.
Together, these four cases of  contingent identity and non-identity strongly 
suggest there is one more intuition to account for when it comes to explaining 
ordinary proper names, E4.
E4: Identity statements (4) to (8) express contingently true identity propositions.
2. thE ProBLEM oF ContingEnt idEntity and non-idEntity
Kripke’s (1980) account of  E1-E3 has become orthodoxy, with most (if  not 
all) analytic philosophers endorsing it. Even those that wish to offer alternative 
accounts of  the semantics for proper names appear to be convinced of  Kripke’s 
claim that rigidity is a semantic, and thus not an optional, feature of  ordinary 
proper names. Stanley (1997), for example, defends a descriptivist account of  
the meaning of  proper names, but still talks about “the fact that natural-language 
proper names are rigid designators” and takes it to be “an empirical discovery 
about natural language.” [Stanley, 1997:555] If  it is a fact of  proper names that 
they are rigid designators, then, one would think, it should not be possible to find 
ordinary referential uses of  proper names where no rigidity is involved. Yet, that 
is precisely what happens in statements (4) to (8).
Philosophers of  language in general are so convinced of  the semantic claim 
for rigidity that Kripke’s theory is even seen as some kind of  obvious truth. 
Stalnaker (1997), for example, goes as far as claiming that “the positive case for 
the theses that Kripke defends is not novel philosophical insight and argument, 
but naïve common sense.” [Stalnaker, 1997:537] It seems fair to say that the view 
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is accepted almost without questioning. Evidence of  this is offered by the fact that 
accounting for the semantic rigidity of  proper names has become one of  the basic 
desiderata for any acceptable theory of  proper names.
Yet, this widespread agreement has not precluded philosophers from noticing 
that the theory has problems with contingent identity (see Gibbard, 1975; Lewis, 
1986; Gallois, 1986 and 1998; and Stalnaker, 1997). Some have tried to offer an 
account that fits Kripke’s model. Yet, a satisfactory account of  the intuition of  
contingency compatible with Kripke’s views is still in the wanting.
Unfortunately for the orthodoxy, the contingency intuition is not easily ignored 
and poses an important threat to the received view. Kripke’s widely accepted view 
excludes the possibility of  contingent identity. If  an identity statement involves 
proper names, then each name refers rigidly to whichever referent it has. In other 
words, each name refers to one and the same object across possible worlds. If, 
furthermore, such a statement happens to be true, then both names refer to one 
and the same object, and they do so rigidly, across all possible worlds that is. 
Hence, any such statement will be true in the actual world and across all possible 
worlds. If  ordinary proper names are rigid designators, then any true identity 
statement involving ordinary proper names will be necessarily true. Briefly put, 
true identity statements involving proper names can only be contingently true if  
those names are not rigid designators.
It is tempting to say, given how well established the theory is among philosophers, 
that there is no such thing as contingent identity, and the associate intuitions are 
simply misleading. However, this strategy seems to be foreclosed to anyone following 
Kripke (1980) and his account of  proper names. Kripke’s theory is built on the 
assumption that competent speakers “have a direct intuition of  the rigidity of  names, 
exhibited in [their] understanding of  the truth conditions of  particular statements”. 
[Kripke, 1980:14] And competent speakers happen to have the intuition that there 
are contingently true identity statements involving only proper names. The theory 
falsely predicts that there should be no such intuitions. We cannot simply dismiss 
the evidence of  contingent identity, something needs to be fixed.
To further demonstrate that this is a substantial problem that cannot be easily 
avoided, let me consider three simple denial strategies one might be tempted to 
follow and show why they fail.
2.1. Denying Identity
The first reply denies that the so-called “cases of  contingent identity” are 
genuine cases of  identity (see Johnston, 1992). According to this strategy, the 
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adequate relation that holds between, say, Lumpl and Goliath is that of  material 
constitution, not the identity relation. If  so, then (4) would be false and, hence, we 
should correct, rather than account for, intuition E4.
This strategy will not work for at least two reasons. First, because denying 
identity leads to deeper metaphysical trouble. As Yablo (1987) puts it, if  Lumpl 
and Goliath are not identical then we must accept the “extraordinarily baffling 
metaphysical coincidence that [clay] and [statue], though entirely distinct, nevertheless 
manage to be exactly alike in almost every ordinary respect: size, weight, colour, 
shape, location, smell, taste, and so on indefinitely” [Yablo, 1987:295]. Things get 
more dubious once we notice that all parts of  Goliath overlap with Lumpl. This is 
usually the case when Goliath is either a part of  Lumpl or is identical with it. Since 
we reject identity, we must accept that Goliath is a part of  Lumpl. And the same 
goes for Lumpl, since all of  its parts overlap with Goliath. So we must conclude 
that Lumpl and Goliath are mutual parts, one is part of  the other and vice versa 
(see Walters, 2017, for a recent take on these issues). Denying identity will only 
make things worse.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, denying identity simply does not 
eliminate the problem. Cases of  material constitution are just a few among those 
of  contingent identity. The Great Western Railway is not materially constituted by 
the Great Western Railway Minus. Had the human embryo not split, Linda and 
Lisa would have been a single person. It makes no sense to say that one would 
have materially constituted the other. If  the railways and the persons of  each 
example are not (or could not be) related by identity, how are they (or could they 
be) related?
2.2. Denying Contingency
The second reply denies that the relevant identities are in fact contingent. 
This is usually done by recalling Leibniz’s Law according to which if  a and b are 
identical then they share all properties. Suppose, the argument goes, that a and 
b are contingently identical. It seems obvious that a has the property of  being 
necessarily identical to a. If  so then, by Leibniz’s Law, b also has this property. But 
then a and b cannot be contingently identical, since b has the property of  being 
necessarily identical to a.
There are several problems with this argument (see Lowe, 1982; Baldwin, 
1984). The most obvious one is that its second premise is conflating two different 
claims (Kripke, 1971, does exactly this). First, there is the claim that any object is 
necessarily self-identical. Second, there is the claim that any object is necessarily 
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identical to whatever it is identical to. The former claim seems obviously true, 
but it is also useless for denying contingency. The latter claim is just a denial of  
contingent identity and, hence, is not obviously true. To see this more clearly, 
consider both readings.
The second premise says that it is true of  a that it has the property of  being 
necessarily identical to a. Under one reading the property that a possesses is that of  
being necessarily self-identical. If  so, then by Leibniz’s Law, b also has this property. It 
follows, then, that both a and b have the property of  being necessarily self-identical. 
It does not follow, however, that either one has the property of  being necessarily 
identical to a. So it does not follow that a and b are, after all, necessarily identical.
Consider now the second alternative reading. On this reading the claim says 
that a has, for some unexplained reason, the property of  being necessarily identical to 
whatever it is identical to. If  this is accepted then it does follow that a has the property 
of  being necessarily identical to a, and, by Leibniz’s Law, it follows that a and b are 
necessarily identical. But this reading is question-begging. It assumes that identity 
relations are necessary when they hold. Contingent identity has no problem with 
Leibniz’s Law.4
2.3. Denying Namehood
Finally, the third reply denies that the expressions used in statements of  
alleged contingent identity are genuine proper names. This is so because the terms 
involved in contingent identity statements have been recently introduced and lack 
any wide non-philosophical use. These names are more like abbreviations of  the 
definite descriptions that were used to introduce them. On this view, if  we want a 
descriptively introduced name to be a genuine proper name we must wait for it to 
be widely used outside the philosophy seminar, so that its meaning can settle into 
what it should be — i.e., one and the same referent across possible worlds.
There are at least two problems with this reply. First, it contradicts the 
view of  proper names that Kripke (1980) expounds thanks to the semantic 
view. According to Kripke’s (1980) causal theory of  reference, all it takes for a 
referential expression ‘N’ to be a genuine proper name is that it be given a referent 
4 There is also no problem with logically contingent identity de re. Under a logical interpre-
tation of  necessity a formula is necessary if  and only if  it is satisfied by every object in every 
model. If  so, then the identity formula ‘x=y’ is not necessarily true, since it is not true of  every 
pair of  objects in every model. So logically contingent identity appears to be the rule, rather 
than the exception.
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o, whether by perception or description, such that the use of  ‘N’ is appropriately 
causally linked with o. The names used in (4)-(8) all fit these criteria. It is, thus, not 
surprising to see Kripke (1980) consider recently introduced and non-widely used 
names to be genuine proper names.
Even if  in some special cases […] a referent is determined by a description, by 
some uniquely identifying property, what that property is doing […] is fixing a 
reference. […] The name denoting that object is then used to refer to that object, 
even in referring to counterfactual situations where the object doesn’t have the 
properties in question. [Kripke, 1980:106-107]
Furthermore, Kripke (1980) repeatedly uses recent, descriptively-introduced, 
names with no wide non-philosophical usage to illustrate his claims about genuine 
proper names.
Let ‘Descartes’ be a name, or rigid designator, of  a certain person, and let ‘B’ 
be a rigid designator of  his body. Then if  Descartes were indeed identical to B, 
the supposed identity, being an identity between two rigid designators, would be 
necessary, and Descartes could not exist without B and B could not exist without 
Descartes. [Kripke, 1980: 145]
Second, and perhaps most importantly, this reply should be avoided because 
it simply fails to stir the traditional view out of  trouble. Suppose we accept that 
recent, descriptively-introduced, and purely philosophical names are not genuine 
names. We should then reject names such as ‘Lumpl’, and ‘Goliath’, for failing to 
be sufficiently settled and non-philosophical. But we still have cases of  contingent 
identity that involve ordinary, widely used, non-philosophical proper names such 
as ‘Great Western Railway’ in (5) and (6).
I have considered three quick replies meant to deny that the traditional view 
has a problem with speaker intuitions of  contingent identity (i.e., E4). Each 
reply fails for different reasons, but there is one inconvenience common to all, 
namely, that they imply that speaker intuitions concerning the truth conditions 
of  modal statements are of  little evidential value. If  accepted, these replies 
constitute evidence against Kripke’s main claim that “we have a direct intuition 
of  the rigidity of  names, exhibited in our understanding of  the truth conditions 
of  particular statements”.[Kripke, 1980:14] Ultimately, denial strategies cast doubt 
over the very evidence that is used to support the semantic theory — i.e., speaker 
intuitions. For the sake of  the received view it will be best to accept that E4 poses 
a real problem.
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3. ProBLEMs With avaiLaBLE aCCounts
As I said above, Gibbard (1975), Lewis (1986), Gallois (1986), and Stalnaker 
(1997) have already noticed the threat posed by E4 and, thus, offer (or suggest) 
a way to fix the semantic theory. The literature includes only three alternative 
approaches, Gibbard’s (1975) sortal rigidity; Lewis’s (1986) quasi-rigidity also 
suggested by Stalnaker (1997); and Gallois’s (1998) restricted rigidity. For reasons 
that I will present, none of  them has gained supporters.
3.1. Sortal Rigidity
To account for E4 the semantic theory needs to gain in flexibility, so that the 
relevant names need not refer in all counterfactual scenarios to the very object 
they refer to in the actual one. In other words, proper names must stop behaving 
like rigid designators without thereby loosing their rigidity. To achieve this goal, 
Gibbard (1975) asks us to add one more level to the semantics of  proper names 
by including reference to a sortal — e.g., statue or lump.
A proper name like ‘Goliath’ denotes a thing in the actual world, and invokes a 
sortal with certain persistence criteria. It then denotes the same thing-of-that-sort 
in every possible world in which it denotes at all. The name ‘Goliath’ itself, for 
instance, denotes a lump of  clay and invokes the sortal statue; hence it denotes the 
same statue in every possible world in which that statue exists. [Gibbard, 1975:195]
In other words, according to Gibbard (1975) proper names are rigid but only 
according to a sortal. They refer to one and the same object in so far as this object 
belongs to the relevant sort of  entity. Sortals are, in a way, like Fregean senses. 
Different coreferential names need not have exactly the same associated sortal. 
Whenever this is the case, those names may be coreferential in one world, if  they 
happen to refer to the same object in that world through different sortals, and yet 
fail to be coreferential in another world, if  they happen to refer to different objects 
in that other world through different sortals. Yet, each name is rigid relative to its 
sortal. Thus, we may have rigid names that corefer in some but not all worlds 
in virtue of  being each associated to a distinct sortal. In all such cases there will 
be instances of  contingent identity. If  no such thing happens, if  the relevant 
corefering names are associated with the same sortal, then given that they are rigid 
the relevant identity statement should hold across possible worlds, it should be 
necessarily true.
Sortal rigidity delivers enough flexibility, as it can easily account for the case of  
Lumpl and Goliath. ‘Lumpl’ and ‘Goliath’ invoke different sortals — i.e., lump and 
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statue respectively — with different persistence criteria. ‘Lumpl’ rigidly denotes the 
same lump of  clay and ‘Goliath’ the same statue, but given that they have different 
sortal-related persistence criteria, there may be worlds where one designates and 
the other does not. In such worlds, the identity does not hold. The account is 
clear and simple, but its explanatory power is fairly limited, as it can only account 
for cases of  contingent identity where the elements of  the identity pair belong to 
different sortals. According to sortal rigidity it is in virtue of  the sortal difference, 
and associated persistence criteria, that the elements of  the identity pair may fail 
to be identical. This is the case with (4), where the relevant names ‘Lumpl’ and 
‘Goliath’ are each associated with distinct sortals (i.e., lump and statue).
(4) Lumpl is identical with Goliath.
But contingent identity goes well beyond these cases. Recall statement (5), a 
contingently true identity statement where the relevant names ‘GWR’ and ‘GWR-’ 
are both associated with exactly the same sortal (i.e., railway). Gibbard’s (1975) 
sortal rigidity fails to account for (5), as it predicts that it should be necessarily true.
(5) The GWR is identical with the GWR-.
3.2. Quasi-Rigidity
In an attempt to account for cases of  contingent identity statements Lewis 
(1986) claims that we should not “expect an ordinary proper name of  a person or 
a thing — of  a railway, say — to be strictly rigid.” Instead, we should expect them 
to be quasi-rigid. A name is a quasi-rigid designator if  it “name[s] at another world 
the counterpart there of  what it names here”. [Lewis, 1986:256] Quasi-rigidity 
relies on relations of  comparative similarity among counterparts. Like comparative 
similarity, quasi-rigidity is inconstant. ‘Aristotle’ may quasi-rigidly refer to different 
individuals in different worlds, but also in the same world, depending on which 
counterpart relation is evoked by the use of  the name.
Given that it does not rely on specific restrictions, such as sortal correspondence, 
but on flexible, context-dependent, relations of  comparative similarity, quasi-
rigidity is much more flexible and, hence, successful than Gibbard’s sortal-rigidity. 
Quasi-rigidity directly accounts for E4. ‘Lumpl’ and ‘Goliath’ refer to different 
objects at different worlds because they evoke different counterpart relations. The 
same goes for ‘GWR’, which refers to different objects (i.e., different counterparts) 
in different worlds — i.e., GWR- in the actual world and the GWR+ in the world 
where the extra railway is absorbed.
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As I said, the inconstancy (i.e, context dependence) of  counterpart relations 
gives the theory enough flexibility to account for all cases of  contingent identity. 
Quasi-rigidity is so flexible that even one and the same “name is quasi-rigid under 
some counterpart relations but not under others” [Lewis, 1986:256].
Stalnaker (1997) observes that quasi-rigidity may also help reconcile Millian 
semantics with Leibniz’s law. By Leibniz’s Law if  a has some property that b lacks, 
a cannot be identical to b, but they can be counterparts. Thus, claims Stalnaker, “if  
“Shakespeare” is a quasi-rigid designator, relative to the actual world, “Shakespeare 
wrote plays” might be true in some other possible worlds — worlds in which a 
counterpart of  Shakespeare wrote plays.” [Stalnaker, 1997:553]
There are substantial costs associated with quasi-rigidity. Unfortunately, 
these costs seem to outweigh the benefits. First of  all, endorsing quasi-rigidity 
is tantamount to rejecting the Millian view of  the reference and rigidity of  
proper names that Kripke (1980) expounds (see Stalnaker, 1997). Counterfactual 
relations constitute reference relations for quasi-rigid terms. As such, one and 
the same quasi-rigid term may not only refer to different objects across possible 
worlds, it may even refer to multiple different ones within the same world, since 
— depending on the relevant context — one and the same individual may have 
multiple counterparts within a single world. It follows, then, that the reference 
of  a quasi-rigid term in a given world is not determined as the single individual 
it denotes in that world. This is clearly a negative result for Kripke’s account, as 
it directly contradicts the Rule of  Rigidity (Kripke, 1980: 10). This can be fixed by 
adding enough stipulations, so that we get a single counterpart in each world (see 
Torza, 2012). But it would still be the case that a proper name may “be quasi-rigid 
relative to one possible world and not relative to another” [Stalnaker, 1997:553]. 
It would be incorrect to say, with Kripke (1980), that ordinary proper names are 
rigid designators. Rather, rigidity would appear to be a relation that proper names 
may have relative to certain contexts (or worlds).
Furthermore, given that, according to the Millian view famously defended 
by Kripke (1980), the semantic value of  a proper name is fully determined by 
its reference, the semantic theory of  proper names is also affected. Given that 
reference is determined by counterpart relations, according to quasi-rigidity, 
the semantic value of  a proper name is determined by the relevant counterpart 
relations. Thus, instead of  keeping the semantic referentialism common to Millian 
views, quasi-rigidity has on offer a form of  descriptivism based on descriptions of  
counterpart relations. As a consequence, we would no longer be able to distinguish 
between proper names and definite descriptions on the basis of  their rigidity or 
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lack thereof, as Kripke (1980) does. Quasi-rigidity is so flexible that even ‘the 
teacher of  Alexander the Great’ will be quasi-rigid relative to a world, it need only 
denote a counterpart of  Aristotle in that world.
Finally, the ontological expense of  quasi-rigidity is perhaps its most substantial 
cost. As I said already, quasi-rigidity relies on counterpart relations, which are 
nothing more than natural relations of  comparative similarity among distinct 
objects. However, for there to be such natural relations of  comparative similarity 
the relata must exist in the same spatiotemporal manner as the said relations. This 
is where the ontological cost kicks in. As Lewis (1986) famously argues, the only 
way to guarantee that we will have all the need counterpart relations is for there 
to exist a plurality of  possible worlds and individuals, all of  them equally real, 
concrete, mind-independent and spatiotemporally located as we ourselves are in 
our own world. Without concrete possibilia there are no counterparts to be the 
relata for the needed relations of  comparative similarity, without such relations 
no counterpart relations either and, hence, no way to determine the reference (in 
any merely possible world) of  any quasi-rigid term. Briefly put, without endorsing 
modal realism and its plurality of  worlds there is no quasi-rigidity.
Some may think that these are not knock-down reasons to reject quasi-rigidity. 
After all, there is nothing intrinsically wrong — or so it seems, see García-Ramírez 
and Shatz, 2011 — in endorsing a descriptivist account of  reference and semantics 
for proper names. Yet, endorsing modal realism in order to account for speaker 
intuitions about contingent identity statements seems unhinged. If  anything, 
quasi-rigidity should be kept merely as our last resort.
3.3. Restricted Rigidity
Let me now consider the last alternative available in the literature. To achieve 
the needed referential flexibility exhibited by names in statements (4) to (8), 
Gallois (1986) and (1998) proposes that we relativize all predicates/properties to 
a world. Thus, the property of  being identical to a, for any a, is itself  relativized to 
a world. Given that identity is part of  the very definition of  rigidity, we need to 
modify the original version and offer a new definition of  a rigid designator. Instead 
of  Kripke’s (1980) notion of  a rigid designator, we have the rigid designation 
condition (RDC):
RDC: d is a rigid designator of  x in world @ if  and only if  the following 
obtains: if  it designates object y in W then there is something z that is identical to 
x in @ and identical to y in W. [See Gallois, 1993:153]
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Gallois makes it possible for an object to be identical with another object at 
a distinct specific possible world while at the same time having different identity 
relations with respect to other different worlds. Whatever a is identical to in the 
actual world need not be identical to whatever it is identical to in world W. Yet, 
somehow we can still guarantee identity throughout all the relevant worlds since 
there is an object z, which happens to be identical to whatever the name designates 
anywhere, namely a.
Gallois’s proposal has a few problematic consequences that explain why it “has 
not found many supporters”. [Schwartz, 2013:492] First, the notion of  identity it 
presupposes differs so much from what is typically understood as identity that it 
is hard to see in what sense it is that notion. It is generally assumed that identity is 
both symmetric and transitive, such that if  x is identical to y, then y is also identical 
to x; and if  y also happens to be identical to z, then x is also identical to z. This is 
not true of  Gallois’s notion of  identity. On his view identity is not transitive as a 
may be identical to b in the actual world and to c in possible world W even without 
b and c being identical at all. It follows that Leibniz’s principle of  indiscernibility 
of  identicals does not hold among identical objects and that, paradoxically, non-
identical objects (e.g., b and c) may nonetheless be part of  an identity relation.
Second, Gallois’s proposal gets rid off  intrinsic properties, all of  them. On 
Gallois’s view, objects have all of  their properties in virtue of  how they relate to 
worlds (see Lewis, 1986:198-202). As a consequence of  this, it turns out that there 
are no intrinsic properties, not even those an object may have in virtue of  its form, 
as all properties (modal or not) are relations that objects hold with respect to some 
or other world.
Third, and last, Gallois’s proposal requires that world indexes pile up. Non-
modal properties are, for some reason, world relative. Modal properties are doubly 
so. Aristotle has the non-modal property of  being 5 feet tall at the actual world and the 
modal property of  being 7 feet tall at the actual world, at world W.
It is rather hard to see how it is that Gallois’s proposal accounts for the 
intuitions of  contingency associated with certain identity statements. On this view, 
being contingently identical is not a property but a relation that certain objects may 
hold relative to certain worlds at a given world. Even if  this notion is somehow 
clarified in a way that does not turn it into a mere cumbersome description of  a 
necessary statement of  identity, Gallois’s account seems to have great ontological 
cost: we no longer have the traditional, simple, symmetric and transitive relation 
of  identity; the resulting notion of  identity seems paradoxical; there are no 
intrinsic properties, only relations to possible worlds; and there are no non-modal 
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properties strictly speaking. It would be much easier, and a more satisfactory 
account, to simply accept that certain identity statements are contingently true 
and, hence, that in such cases the proper names used are not rigid designators.
4. rigidity and ContingEnCy
Intuitions E3 and E4 pose a difficult theoretical challenge. They seem to point 
in opposite directions. On the one hand, E3 points towards rigidity and, indirectly, 
towards the necessity of  identity. On the other hand, E4 directly points towards 
the contingency of  identity. It is difficult to see how to account for both. In this 
section I want to merely gesture toward an alternative view of  proper names that 
can account for both E3 and E4.
The thesis that true identity statements involving proper names are necessary 
truths is a consequence of  the assumption that proper names are rigid designators. 
A further assumption is needed to guarantee that no true identity statement 
involving proper names may ever be contingently true. For this latter result to 
be obtained it must be that the rigidity of  proper names is a necessary, perhaps 
essential feature of  them. It must be impossible to use a proper name competently 
to refer to an object and fail to do so rigidly. In other words, rigidity must be a 
semantic, obligatory feature of  proper names.
This latter assumption is not, however, an obvious one. Kripke (1980) himself  
does not make any claim as to whether rigidity is a semantic or, alternatively, 
a pragmatic feature of  proper names. Traditionally philosophers have simply 
assumed the former without further argument. Yet if  it is the latter, if  rigidity is 
a context-dependent, pragmatic feature of  referential uses of  proper names, then 
the possibility is open for non-rigid referential uses of  proper names. If  such were 
the case, we could account for both E3 and E4 as competent intuitions associated 
with distinct referential uses of  proper names. E3 accompanies contexts where 
names are used, either by assumption or by stipulation, rigidly. E4 accompanies 
contexts where names are used, either by assumption or by stipulation, non-rigidly.
Rejecting the widely held assumption that rigidity is a semantic, obligatory 
feature of  all referential uses of  ordinary proper names gives us a way to account for 
both conflicting intuitions in a substantive way. It is not that they are inconsistent 
intuitions, but rather that they are context-sensitive. Proper names are sometimes, 
perhaps most of  the time, rigidly used. When they are not, they may give place 
to the intuition of  contingency. Let me conclude this brief  gesture towards a 
pragmatic account of  rigidity by illustrating how competent speakers may benefit 
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from contextual features to make a referential, yet non-rigid, use of  an ordinary 
proper name.
Consider again the historical case presented by Lewis’ (1986) concerning the 
Great Western Railway.
The Great Western Railway ought to have absorbed two other railways early on: the 
Bristol and Gloucester, and the Birmingham and Gloucester. But it tried to drive 
too hard a bargain. In 1845 the line from Bristol to Gloucester to Birmingham 
fell into rival hands. Therefore, after the grouping of  railways in 1923, the post-
grouping Great Western lacked a part that it might have had. What we know as the 
Great Western, without the missing line, was the whole of  the Great Western; not, 
as it so easily might have been, a part of  a still Greater Western. [Lewis, 1986:248]
Take sentence (9), it contains the name ‘Great Western Railway’ that directly 
refers to the actual railway running from London to the southwest and west of  
England. Intuitively, an ordinary modal claim such as (9) is true.
(9) The Great Western Railway could have been bigger than it currently is.
In fact, it seems intuitive (following Kripke) that ‘Great Western Railway’ is 
being rigidly used in (9) as the truth of  the proposition expressed by it depends on 
what goes on with the Great Western Railway across possible worlds.
Now let us stipulate that ‘Greater Western Railway’ refers to the railway that 
would have existed had negotiations gone differently, with the Great Western 
Railway successfully absorbing the other two lines. With this stipulation as part 
of  the context of  use of  ‘Great Western Railway’ and ‘Greater Western Railway’, 
we can infer (10), which seems intuitively true. Yet (10), even though it is a true 
identity statement, cannot be considered to be necessary, since in this same context 
(11) follows from (9) and the said stipulation. And (11) seems just as intuitively 
true as (10).
(10) The Great Western Railway is not the Greater Western Railway.
(11) The Great Western Railway could have been the Greater Western Railway.
The truth of  the pair of  statements (10)-(11) shows more clearly how 
ordinary names may be used in referential yet non-rigid ways. Exactly how this 
happens and what role the relevant stipulation plays is yet to be determined. The 
example shows, however, that the rigidity of  ordinary proper names may vary 
from context to context, as ‘Great Western Railway’ appears to be rigid in (9) and 
non-rigid in the pair (10)-(11). A detailed account of  how context may change 
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the rigidity / non-rigidity of  referential uses of  proper names is certainly needed. 
Fully achieving such a goal goes beyond the limits of  the present work. Suffice it 
to say that a presupposition-based account, according to which rigidity is a con- 
ven tional yet eliminable presupposition that typically accompanies referential uses 
of  proper names may do the explanatory work.5
5. soME PhiLosoPhiCaL ConsEquEnCEs
The received view, according to which proper names are essentially (unavoidably) 
rigid, is related to multiple discussions in philosophy of  language, philosophy of  
mind, epistemology and metaphysics among many others. It is natural to wonder 
about the fate of  at least some of  these debates if  we were to adopt the view that 
rigidity is a context-dependent feature of  names. Let me briefly consider some of  
them.
A term is directly referential if  it does not pick out its denotation by means of  
mediating descriptive information. If  the context-dependent view suggested is 
correct, there is no substantial relation between direct reference and rigidity. The 
former depends on the semantics for names, the latter on contextual features of  
their use. Thus, there may be directly referential terms that are used non-rigidly in 
certain contexts, for example, ‘Lumpl’, ‘Goliath’, ‘Great Western Railway’.
Definite Descriptions are said to be a distinct kind of  expression modally differing 
from proper names. The received view claims this is a difference of  rigidity and 
that, as such, it is a semantic difference. If  rigidity turns out to be a contextual 
feature there may still be a substantial difference between ordinary proper names 
and definite descriptions, but it seems it would be a difference in use and not a 
semantic one.
Last, but not least, consider contingent identity statements. Unlike the received 
view, the contextual view suggested in section 4 shows how identity statements 
involving ordinary proper names may be contingently true. The consequences 
of  this result are plenty. It clears the path in multiple areas of  philosophy — i.e., 
personal identity, persistence through time, social metaphysics, etc. — where a 
coherent and metaphysically simple notion of  contingently true identity statements 
is needed (see Lewis, 1983).
One salient case in point is the metaphysics of  mind. Kripke (1980) famously 
argued that, since identity statements involving proper names can only be necessarily 
5 See García-Ramírez (forthcoming) for a detailed account.
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true, then the mind-brain identity thesis must be false. This now seems mistaken, 
identity statements involving proper names may also be contingently true. So the 
mind-brain identity thesis may be rescued. A closer look at Kripke (1980) suggests 
that he benefits from using proper names in contexts that suggest a non-rigid 
interpretation.
Let ‘A’ name a particular pain sensation, and let `B’ name the corresponding brain 
state. Prima facie, it would seem that it is at least logically possible that B should have 
existed (Jones’s brain could have been in exactly that state at the time in question) 
without Jones feeling any pain at all, and thus without the presence of  A. [Kripke, 
1980: 146]
Kripke fixes the context in two ways. On the one hand, he introduces a modal 
distinction between two objects, A and B. He thereby creates a context that selects 
the relevant features that make true what he says. On the other hand, he introduces 
new names by associating them each with a different object. The resulting context 
is pretty obviously inconsistent with the claim that one and the same object is 
being referred to across counterfactual scenarios. Naturally, ‘A’ and ‘B will not be 
rigidly interpreted. No wonder why the truth of  “A = B” seems contingent.
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